Abstract
The potential size of the electronic business market offers great incentives to trading agents that can bargain, bid in auctions and trade in exchanges. Much of business negotiation is multi-issue. A generic ‘information-based’ agent is proposed for multi-issue negotiation. Successful negotiation depends on shrewd strategies driven by the right information. This agent has machinery to value information and to manage its integrity. A multi-issue, many-to-many clearing house, and an agent to trade in it, are proposed.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Debenham, J. (2006). A Trading Agent for a Multi-Issue Clearing House. In: Bramer, M., Coenen, F., Allen, T. (eds) Research and Development in Intelligent Systems XXII. SGAI 2005. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-226-3_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-226-3_14
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-84628-225-6
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