Abstract
Lee et al.’s presented a Verifier-based key agreement protocol in 2004. They claimed that their protocol was secure against Stolen-verifier attack in the case of server compromise. However, it is not really a secure protocol. In this paper, we briefly review this scheme and demonstrate the flaw, which once was pointed out by Shim and Seo. Subsequently, we propose a novel Verifier-based authenticated key agreement protocol and show that it withstands Stolen-verifier attack, Dictionary attack, and man-in-middle attack.
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Ma, C., Ao, J., Li, J. (2007). A Novel Verifier-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol. In: Huang, DS., Heutte, L., Loog, M. (eds) Advanced Intelligent Computing Theories and Applications. With Aspects of Contemporary Intelligent Computing Techniques. ICIC 2007. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 2. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74282-1_117
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74282-1_117
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-74281-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74282-1
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