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Game-Theoretic Agent Programming in Golog Under Partial Observability

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KI 2006: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (KI 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4314))

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Abstract

We present the agent programming language POGTGolog, which integrates explicit agent programming in Golog with game-theoretic multi-agent planning in partially observable stochastic games. It deals with the case of one team of cooperative agents under partial observability, where the agents may have different initial belief states and not necessarily the same rewards. POGTGolog allows for specifying a partial control program in a high-level logical language, which is then completed by an interpreter in an optimal way. To this end, we define a formal semantics of POGTGolog programs in terms of Nash equilibria, and we specify a POGTGolog interpreter that computes one of these Nash equilibria. We illustrate the usefulness of POGTGolog along a rugby scenario.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informationssysteme, Technische Universität Wien, Favoritenstraße 9-11, A-1040 Vienna, Austria

    Alberto Finzi & Thomas Lukasiewicz

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, Via Salaria 113, I-00198 Rome, Italy

    Alberto Finzi & Thomas Lukasiewicz

Authors
  1. Alberto Finzi
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  2. Thomas Lukasiewicz
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Christian Freksa Michael Kohlhase Kerstin Schill

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Finzi, A., Lukasiewicz, T. (2007). Game-Theoretic Agent Programming in Golog Under Partial Observability. In: Freksa, C., Kohlhase, M., Schill, K. (eds) KI 2006: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. KI 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69912-5_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69912-5_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69911-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69912-5

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